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It’s Always Windy in McCain Valley: Vicarious 
Liability Under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act 
GEORGE A. CROTON* 
This Note considers whether a federal agency that grants a license, lease, or permit 
to a wind farm developer can thereafter be held vicariously liable for the developer’s 
violations of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act’s (“MBTA”) “take provisions.” It 
concludes by positing that a federal agency can justifiably and logically be held 
vicariously liable in situations where the violation was both foreseeable and 
inevitable. 
 
Part I provides background to the question, discussing a recent circuit split over the 
question, the interplay of the MBTA and the Administrative Procedure Act, and an 
older circuit split over the meaning of the word “take” as applied to the MBTA. Part 
II frames the various arguments made in the two cases that resulted in the recent 
circuit split over the potential for federal agency vicarious liability. Part III analyzes 
the text, history, and purpose of the MBTA; compares the issue of MBTA vicarious 
liability to a similar and instructive line of cases arising under the Endangered 
Species Act; and presents an argument for a “middle ground,” where federal 
agencies can be held vicariously liable for not securing a take permit in scenarios 
where the developer they are licensing will inevitably commit a violation of the 
MBTA. 
 
 * J.D. Candidate 2018, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. Many thanks to 
Professor Dave Owen and Eric Glitzenstein for all their help and advice. All my love to my grandmother, 
Renee “Motsy” Cary. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Renewable energy production in the United States reached an  
all-time high in 2015, representing 13.44% of all domestically produced 
electricity.1 The Obama-era saw unprecedented enthusiasm for clean 
energy; as of July 2016, the grant program established by section 1603 
of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act funded 105,733 
projects, with total estimated private, regional, state, and federal 
funding sitting at $90.2 billion.2 More than twenty states enacted 
“renewable portfolio standards” requiring utilities to generate a certain 
percentage of power from renewable energy sources.3 For many, the 
 
 1. Electric Power Monthly, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. tbl. 1.1 (2017). 
 2. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OVERVIEW AND STATUS UPDATE OF THE § 1603 PROGRAM (2017). 
 3. Jocelyn Durkay, State Renewable Portfolio Standards and Goals, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. 
LEGISLATURES (Aug. 1, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/renewable-portfolio-standards.aspx. 
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prospect of our energy system making better use of potentially limitless 
sources like solar and wind represents America’s future, free of the 
threats of pollution and a changing climate.4 
However, renewable energy comes with its own set of costs. Solar 
and wind farms are typically extremely large, as the amount of energy 
they are capable of producing is necessarily correlated with how much 
space they take up.5 Studies show that a wind farm requires a whopping 
46,000 acres of land in to order produce 1000 megawatts of power.6 A 
concentrated solar power plant requires 6000 to 10,000 acres.7 By 
contrast, coal-fired and nuclear power plants require 640 to 1280 acres 
to produce the same output.8 Solar and wind projects often sprawl 
across a combination of local, state, federal, and private lands, 
triggering a complex interplay of guiding statutes and various agencies.9 
The intrusive presence of large renewable energy projects has drawn the 
ire of conservation groups, Native American tribes, and localities that 
border or overlap with development sites.10 Not surprisingly, these 
controversies frequently result in years of protracted litigation. 
All in all, siting these large facilities often results in a variety of 
bitter disputes. If there is one common thread, however, it is the 
negative effects that the construction and operation of these facilities 
can have on wildlife. Solar and wind farms are typically sited in 
undeveloped areas, with public lands being favored.11 In many cases 
these lands represent important habitats for endangered species. The 
 
 4. Steve Leone, Billionaire Buffet Bets on Solar Energy, RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD (Dec.  
7, 2011), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/articles/2011/12/billionaire-buffett-bets-on-solar-
energy.html. 
 5. The Solar Star solar farm occupies a 3200 acre site in the Mojave Desert. Eric Wesoff, Solar 
Star, Largest PV Power Plant in the World, Now Operational, GREEN TECH MEDIA (June 26, 2015), 
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/solar-star-largest-pv-power-plant-in-the-world-
now-operational#gs._ih=kLw. 
 6. Alexandra B. Klass, Energy and Animals: A History of Conflict, 3 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE AND 
ENERGY L. 159, 184 (2012). 
 7. Id. at 193–94.  
 8. Id. 
 9. See Rob Nikolewski, Expansion of Tule Wind Project OK’d by State, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. 
(Oct. 31, 2016, 11:40 AM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/business/energy-green/ 
sd-fi-tule2-approval-20161028-story.html.  
 10. See generally Save Panoche Valley v. San Benito Cty., 217 Cal. App. 4th 503 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2013) (challenging the county’s certification of an environmental impact report (“EIR”) regarding a 
proposed solar power development in the area and the county’s cancellations of Williamson Act 
agricultural land preserve contracts.); Quechan Tribe of Fort Yuma Indian Reservation v. U.S. Dep’t 
of the Interior, 927 F. Supp. 2d 921 (S.D. Cal 2013) (noting that the Indian tribe was alleging that 
Bureau of Land Management’s approval of utility-scale wind power project violated National 
Historic Preservation Act, Federal Land Policy and Management Policy Act, National Environmental 
Policy Act, Archaeological Resources Protection Act, Native American Graves Protection and 
Repatriation Act, and Administrative Procedure Act). 
 11. Janine Blaeloch, Government Subsidies for Industrial-Scale Solar, SOLAR DONE RIGHT (Dec. 
12, 2011), http://solardoneright.org/index.php/briefings/post/government_subsidies_for_indust 
rial-scale_solar/. 
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endangered desert tortoise and the destruction of its arid habitat are 
frequently the subject of litigation in the court of Southern California.12 
The construction of solar and wind farms destroys habitat necessary for 
their survival and can damage eggs buried underground.13 Concentrated 
solar thermal plants have been observed to practically vaporize birds in 
midair due to the intense heat created by the fields of heliostat 
mirrors.14 The endangered blunt-nosed leopard lizard, San Joaquin kit 
fox, giant kangaroo rat, and big-horn sheep have all been subjects of 
concern, as well as various plant species.15 However, the most visible 
conflict between renewable energy production and wildlife may be the 
damage that wind farms do to avian species. The spinning blades of the 
enormous windmills are estimated to cause the deaths of at least 
573,000 birds and 888,000 bats every year.16 
The Tule Wind Project is a paradigmatic example of the types of 
disputes that arise from the siting and development of a large wind 
farm. First proposed by a company named Avangrid Renewables in 
2004, the Tule Wind Project is slated to produce 201 megawatts of 
power from a 12,000-acre site in San Diego’s East County.17 The site is 
located in McCain Valley, a resource conservation area that 
encompasses 38,692 acres of the In-Ko-Pah Mountains, one of 
Southern California’s coastal mountain ranges.18 The proposed site is 
largely located on federal land overseen by the Bureau of Land 
Management, but extends into state lands managed by the California 
State Lands Commission as well as private lands and tribal lands that 
belong to the Ewiiaapaayp Band of Kumeyaay Indians.19 McCain Valley, 
typical of the mountain ranges of Southern California, largely consists 
 
 12. Chris Mooney, Why Big Solar and Environmentalists Are Clashing over the California 
Desert, WASH. POST (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/ 
wp/2016/08/15/the-greens-and-solar-industry-agree-on-climate-but-they-cant-agree-on-the-califor 
nia-desert. 
 13. See W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, 993 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1134 (C.D. Cal. 2012); Defs. Of 
Wildlife v. Jewell, No. CV 14-1656-MWF(RZX), 2014 WL 1364452 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2014). 
 14. Morgan Walton, A Lesson from Icarus: How the Mandate for Rapid Solar Development 
Has Singed a Few Feathers, 40 VT. L. REV. 131, 132 (2015) (“The workers called these birds 
‘streamers’ for the image they created as the animals spontaneously ignited in midair and hurtled to 
the ground in a smoking, smoldering ball.”). 
 15. Klass, supra note 6, at 194–95.  
 16. K. Shawn Smallwood, Comparing Bird and Bat Fatality-Rate Estimates Among North 
American Wind-Energy Projects, 37 WILDLIFE SOC’Y BULLETIN 19, 19 (2013). 
 17. Rob Nikolewski, Tule Wind Project Takes Another Step, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (July 26, 
2016, 3:46 PM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-tule-wind-fight-2016jul26-story.html. 
 18. McCain Valley Resource Conservation Area, DESERTUSA, 
https://www.desertusa.com/mccain/oct_mcain.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2018).  
 19. Nikolewski, supra note 17; see also Bureau of Indian Affairs Approves Tule Wind Farm 
Lease, EAST COUNTY MAG. (Dec. 31, 2013), http://www.eastcountymagazine.org/bureau-indian-
affairs-approves-tule-wind-farm-lease.  
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of untouched chaparral.20 The valley is hot and dry, home to bighorn 
sheep, great horned owls, antelope, and various other wildlife.21 It also 
represents prime breeding habitat for golden eagles.22 In 2014, roughly 
fifty breeding pairs of golden eagles were found to be threatened by the 
prospect of encroaching human development in San Diego County.23 
Needless to say, the prospect of the construction of the Tule wind farm 
and the potential threat it posed to eagles and other species sparked a 
fierce backlash. 
The goal of this Note is to provide an answer to the central 
question that arose from the litigation over the Tule Wind Project. That 
question is whether a federal agency acting in a permitting or licensing 
capacity can be held vicariously liable for Migratory Bird Treaty Act 
(“MBTA”) violations committed by a third-party developer. In this 
Note, I argue that it can, but only in limited situations where the 
violation is completely foreseeable and inevitable, and where the 
agency’s permit or license is a proximate and but-for cause of the 
violation. 
Part I discusses the Ninth Circuit case that arose from the dispute 
over the Tule Wind Project, Protect Our Communities Foundation  
v. Jewell, as well as a very similar case from the D.C. Circuit, Public 
Employees for Environmental Responsibility v. Hopper.24 It describes 
the statutory bases for the plaintiffs’ claims, as well as an old and well 
developed circuit split over how to interpret the “take provision” of the 
MBTA. Although that split is largely beyond the narrow scope of the 
question that this Note tackles, discussing it is useful for framing the 
issues here. Part II explores the arguments and counterarguments 
raised by the parties in Protect our Communities and Public Employees 
and then frames the overarching question of this Note through those 
arguments. Part III analyzes the text, history, and purpose of the MBTA 
and then describes the application of the federal agency vicarious 
liability argument in Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) take cases, as well 
as the differences and similarities between the ESA and MBTA. Finally, 
Part III articulates the circumstances in which a vicarious liability claim 
should, and should not, succeed under the MBTA. 
 
 20. McCain Valley Resource Conservation Area, supra note 18. 
 21. McCain Valley Resource Conservation Area, supra note 18. 
 22. Advocacy, PROTECT OUR COMMUNITIES FOUND, http://protectourcommunities.org/advocacy 
(last visited Jan. 20, 2018).  
 23. Morgan Lee, Windfarm Plan Rebuffed over Eagle Impacts, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Sept. 
29, 2014, 10:52 AM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-eagle-lawsuit-against-wind-
farm-2014sep29-story.html. 
 24. Protect Our Cmtys. Found. v. Jewell, 825 F.3d 571, 578 (9th Cir. 2016); Pub. Emps. for 
Envtl. Responsibility v. Hopper, 827 F.3d 1077, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
In 2014, the San Diego-based conservation nonprofits Protect Our 
Communities Foundation and Backcountry Against Dumps brought an 
action in the federal district court for the Southern District of 
California, challenging the Bureau of Land Management’s (“BLM”) 
decision to authorize development of the Tule Wind Project.25 The 
plaintiffs alleged that the BLM’s approval of a right-of-way for the wind 
project violated the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), the National 
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), the MBTA, and the Bald and 
Golden Eagles Protection Act (“BGEPA”).26 
The plaintiffs attacked various perceived failings in the preparation 
of the Environmental Impact Statement required by NEPA.27 They also 
argued that either the BLM or the developer were required to obtain a 
“take permit” under the MBTA, claiming that the project would 
inevitably cause the deaths of golden eagles through habitat destruction 
or collision with wind turbines or transmission lines.28 On motion for 
summary judgment, the district court found that the BLM had satisfied 
the mandates of NEPA, and that although the court was “deeply 
troubled by the project’s potential to injure golden eagles and other rare 
and special-status birds,” the agency was not required to secure a take 
permit under the MBTA or BGEPA.29 The plaintiffs filed two separate 
notices of appeal, with Protect Our Communities Foundation solely 
addressing the MBTA issues.30 
The plaintiff’s MBTA arguments eventually became the centerpiece 
of the appeal. Protect Our Communities Foundation argued that 
through the APA, the Bureau itself could be liable for violations of the 
MBTA’s take provisions attributable to bird deaths caused by the wind 
farms to whom they granted a lease.31 The Ninth Circuit found this 
argument untenable, holding that the BLM could not be held liable for 
bird deaths caused by the wind farm it had licensed, and thus was not 
required to secure an MBTA take permit.32 The court held that the act of 
granting a right of way was not sufficient to render the BLM liable for 
the deaths of birds ostensibly caused by the wind farm itself, and that 
the statute did not contemplate secondary liability of this nature.33 
Furthermore, the court found that there was no requirement to obtain 
 
 25. Complaint at 1–2, Protect Our Cmtys. Found. v. Jewell, No. 3:13-cv-00575-JLS-JMA, 2014 
WL 1364453, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2014), aff’d, 825 F.3d at 571. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 3. 
 28. Id. at 3, 22. 
 29. Id. at 21.  
 30. Protect Our Cmtys. Found., 825 F.3d at 578. 
 31. Id. at 585. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
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an MBTA take permit prior to construction, because the language of the 
lease required the developer to comply with all “applicable laws and 
regulations.” The court reasoned that the BLM could withdraw its  
right-of-way approval at any time if it determined that the developer 
failed to comply with those provisions.34 
Across the county, and around the time that the Ninth Circuit 
issued its ruling, the D.C. Circuit acknowledged that the Bureau of 
Ocean Energy Management (“BOEM”) and the Fish and Wildlife Service 
(“FWS”) were required to ensure that another wind farm obtain an 
MBTA take permit.35 That wind farm, the Cape Wind Energy Project, is 
cut from the same basic cloth as the Tule Wind Project. Various 
conservation groups challenged a proposal to build and maintain 130 
wind turbines in the Horseshoe Shoal region of Nantucket Sound.36 
Nantucket Sound is a crucial habitat for threatened or endangered 
migratory birds, including roseate terns and piping plovers.37 According 
to the FWS, at the end of the summer and beginning of fall, “there is the 
potential that every breeding adult roseate tern in the northeast 
population . . . will be in Nantucket Sound, within twenty miles of the 
Cape Wind Project area.”38 
The plaintiffs in Public Employees for Environmental 
Responsibility asserted that the proposed turbines were guaranteed to 
kill eighty to one hundred endangered roseate terns and at least ten 
threatened piping plovers over the life of the project.39 As in Protect 
Our Communities, the lease granted to Cape Wind by the BOEM 
contained language requiring compliance with all applicable laws.40 In 
the Ninth Circuit, that language was enough to excuse the agency from 
ensuring that a MBTA take permit was secured prior to construction.41 
However, in the D.C. Circuit, the developer and the agency both 
conceded at oral argumentunder pressure from the panelthat the 
take permit had to be obtained by one of them in order to comply with 
the statute.42 The D.C. Circuit ruled accordingly, taking them at their 
 
 34. Id. at 587. 
 35. Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. Hopper, 827 F.3d 1077, 1088 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 
(declining to reach the question outright, as Cape Wind and the Bureau of Ocean Energy 
Management both conceded that a permit was required to comply with the MBTA, stating “we take 
the defendants at their word that the lease requires a migratory bird permit and that Cape Wind will 
apply for one.” The court arguably drew this concession out at oral argument, as addressed below). 
 36. Id. at 1080-81. 
 37. Id. at 1088. 
 38. Brief for Appellant at 9, Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. Hopper, No. 14-5301, 2015 
WL 3465970 (D.D.C. May 26, 2015) (internal quotations omitted). 
 39. Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility, 827 F.3d at 1088. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Protect Our Cmtys. Found. v. Jewell, 825 F.3d 571, 585 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 42. Telephone Interview with Eric Glitzenstein, Partner, Meyer Glitzenstein & Eubanks LLP (Feb. 
21, 2017) (on file with author); see also Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility, 827 F.3d at 1088 n.11. 
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word.43 In light of the D.C. Circuit’s opinion, the plaintiffs in Protect 
Our Communities Foundation requested an en banc hearing, but were 
denied.44 
Thus a form of circuit split was born, albeit in a roundabout way. 
Although the D.C. Circuit declined to directly address the issue after the 
agency conceded the point, these subtly contradictory holdings pose an 
important question. Does incidental take of a protected species that 
results from the construction and operation of wind farms implicate the 
liability of the federal agency governing their development? Or would 
that liability amount to what the Ninth Circuit deemed “attenuated 
secondary liability” beyond the scope of the statute?45 
A. THE MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY ACT 
The “International Convention for the Protection of Migratory 
Birds” between the United States and Great Britain (acting for Canada) 
eventually led to the codification of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 
1918.46 The act was an effort to protect migratory bird species in 
reaction to population decline that was the result of overhunting and 
the trade in birds and their feathers.47 Since 1918, similar conventions 
between the United States and four other nations have been made and 
incorporated into the MBTA: Mexico (1936), Japan (1972), the Soviet 
Union (1976), and again with Russia after the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union.48 The act is one of the earliest examples of federal 
environmental laws, and currently lists 800 species as protected.49 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote that the motivations behind the 
enactment of the statute represented “a national interest of . . . the first 
magnitude.”50 The Treaty “recited that many species of birds . . . were of 
great value as a source of food and in destroying insects injurious to 






 43. Protect Our Cmtys. Found., 825 F.3d at 588. 
 44. Nikolewski, supra note 17. 
 45. Protect Our Cmtys. Found., 825 F.3d at 585. 
 46. Martha Harbison, The Migratory Bird Treaty Act, Explained, AUDOBON SOC’Y (May  
22, 2015), http://www.audubon.org/news/the-migratory-bird-treaty-act-explained. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Migratory Bird Treaty Act: Birds Protected, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., https://www.fws. 
gov/birds/policies-and-regulations/laws-legislations/migratory-bird-treaty-act.php (last updated 
Dec. 3, 2017). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Mo. v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920). 
 51. Humane Soc’y of the U.S. v. Glickman, 217 F.3d 882, 883 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
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The MBTA states that: 
[I]t shall be unlawful at any time, by any means or in any manner, to 
pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take, capture, or kill, 
possess, offer for sale, sell, offer to barter, barter, offer to purchase, 
purchase, deliver for shipment, ship, export, import, cause to be 
shipped, exported, or imported, deliver for transportation, transport 
or cause to be transported, carry or cause to be carried, or receive for 
shipment, transportation, carriage, or export, any migratory bird, any 
part, nest, or egg of any such bird, or any product, whether or not 
manufactured, which consists, or is composed in whole or in part, of 
any such bird or any part, nest, or egg thereof, included in the terms 
of the conventions between the United States and Great Britain for 
the protection of migratory birds concluded August 16, 1916 [without 
a permit or express waiver] . . . .52 
Unlike other more recent examples of environmental legislation, 
such as the ESA or Clean Water Act, the MBTA provides only for 
criminal enforcement by the United States.53 It does not contain a 
citizen suit provision to allow for civil suits seeking to ensure federal 
agency compliance.54 However, the D.C. courts, and now arguably the 
Ninth Circuit, follow the view that claims brought under the APA can 
enforce MBTA limitations against federal agencies.55 
B. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 
Enacted in 1946, the APA governs the way in which federal 
administrative agencies propose and establish regulations.56 Former 
Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee Senator Pat McCarran called 
the APA “a bill of rights for the hundreds of thousands of Americans 
whose affairs are controlled or regulated” by federal agencies.57 The 
basic purposes of the APA are to require agencies to keep the public 
informed of their organization, procedures, and rules; provide for 
public participation in the rulemaking process; establish uniform 
standards for the conduct of formal rulemaking and adjudication; and 
to define the scope of judicial review.58 
 
 52. Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2012). 
 53. JOHN C. MARTIN ET AL., CROWELL MORING, THE MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY ACT: AN OVERVIEW 
(2016), https://www.crowell.com/files/The-Migratory-Bird-Treaty-Act-An-Overview-Crowell-Mor 
ing.pdf. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id.; see also Protect Our Cmtys. Found. v. Jewell, 825 F.3d 571, 585 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(“Through the APA’s prohibition against unlawful agency action, a plaintiff may bring a civil suit to 
compel agency compliance with the MBTA.”); City of Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1225 (9th 
Cir. 2004).  
 56. See generally Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 500 (2012).  
 57. DONALD D. BARRY & HOWARD R. WHITCOMB, THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION 32 (3d ed. 2005).  
 58. Ralph F. Fuchs, Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act, Prepared 
by the United States Department of Justice; The Federal Administrative Procedure Act and the 
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Under the APA, agency decisions must be upheld unless the court 
finds that the decision or action is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”59 Agency action 
taken “without observance of procedure required by law” may also be 
set aside.60 In short, the APA serves the dual purposes of providing 
guidelines for agencies and acting as an enforcement mechanism for the 
public. 
C. THE INCIDENTAL TAKE SPLIT 
The issue of vicarious federal agency liability that arose in Protect 
Our Communities and Public Employees must be framed in the context 
of a more developed split over the general purpose of the “take” 
provision in the MBTA. The word “take” is one of the most heavily 
litigated terms in wildlife law. While this is especially true in the context 
of the ESA, the MBTA has also seen its fair share of controversy.61 The 
FWS defines “take” for MBTA purposes to mean “pursue, hunt, shoot, 
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect.”62 This definition clearly 
encompasses intentional harm like hunting, trapping, or poisoning. 
There is a great deal of confusion, however, as to whether it should be 
extended to activities that inadvertently or unintentionally cause the 
deaths of birds. Examples of these activities include logging, petroleum 
industry operations, the construction of telecommunications towers, 
and of course the operation of wind turbines.63 In 2001, President 
Clinton explained that for the purposes of the MBTA, “‘[t]ake’ means 
take as defined in 50 C.F.R. § 10.12, and includes both ‘intentional’ and 
‘unintentional’ take.”64 President Clinton did not clarify whether this 
definition refers solely to hunting or poaching activities or instead could 
be any activity that incidentally harms birds.65  
Some courts interpret the “take” provision of the MBTA narrowly, 
requiring activities affirmatively intended to harm birds. For example, 
in United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals found that a defendant petroleum corporation was not liable 
under the MBTA for the deaths of migratory birds that had become 
 
Administrative Agencies, Vol. VII of the New York University School of Law Institute Proceedings, 
23 IND. L.J. 362 (1948). 
 59. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). 
 60. Id. at § 706(2)(D). 
 61. See generally Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995). 
 62. 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (2017). 
 63. Cf. Babbitt, 515 U.S. at 697 (explaining that the ESA’s take provision includes “harm.” 
Additionally, agency regulations and the Supreme Court have defined “harm” to include habitat 
modification and other unintentional damage). 
 64. Exec. Order No. 13,186, 66 Fed. Reg. 3853 (Jan. 10, 2001). 
 65. Id. 
I – CROTON_11 (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/10/2018  10:16 AM 
February 2018]                   IT’S ALWAYS WINDY IN MCCAIN VALLEY 657 
trapped in open-air oil production facilities.66 The CITGO court 
principally relied on Justice Scalia’s dissenting argument in Babbitt  
v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Oregon.67 The 
Fifth Circuit held that “take” means “to reduce those animals, by killing 
or capturing, to human control,” and that “[o]ne does not reduce an 
animal to human control accidentally or by omission; he does so 
affirmatively.”68 
Other courts have held that the MBTA imposes strict liability, and 
does not distinguish intentional acts from acts that accidentally or 
indirectly kill birds. In United States v. FMC Corp., the Second Circuit 
held that a corporation engaged in the manufacture of a highly toxic 
pesticide was subject to MBTA liability for failing to prevent the 
chemicals from reaching a pond where it harmed protected birds.69 The 
court found that: 
The principle here is the same as in the tort situation even though in 
this case the [chemical] remained on the property of [the 
corporation], and the birds found their way to the attracting . . . pond. 
When one enters into a business or activity for his own benefit, and 
that benefit results in harm to others, the party should bear the 
responsibility for that harm.70 
Similarly, in United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc. the Tenth 
Circuit found that the MBTA rendered the taking or killing of migratory 
birds a strict liability crime, and that it was not necessary to prove that 
defendants violated MBTA with specific intent or guilty knowledge.71 
The Apollo Energies court found that “[a]s a matter of statutory 
construction, the ‘take’ provision of the [MBTA] does not contain a 
scienter requirement.”72 
Perhaps surprisingly, the Ninth Circuit has generally followed the 
narrower interpretation of the MBTA’s take provision.73 This view may 
be shifting, however. While not addressed outright, a sense of 
acceptance of the applicability of the take provision to incidental take 
 
 66. See generally U.S. v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 67. Id. at 489. 
 68. Id.; see also Babbitt, 515 U.S. at 717 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 69. U.S. v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 908 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 70. Id. at 907. 
 71. U.S. v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 684 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 72. Id. at 686.  
 73. See Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 303 (9th Cir. 1991):  
These cases do not suggest that habitat destruction, leading indirectly to bird deaths, 
amounts to the ‘taking’ of migratory birds within the meaning of the Migratory Bird Treaty 
Act. We are not free to give words a different meaning than that which Congress and the 
Agencies charged with implementing congressional directives have historically given them 
under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and the Endangered Species Act. Habitat destruction 
causes ‘harm’ to the owls under the ESA but does not ‘take’ them within the meaning of 
the MBTA. 
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scenarios is implicit in Protect Our Communities, at least where the 
take is inevitable or foreseeable.74 The court did not address the split 
over the definition of take as described above, focusing instead on the 
issue of third party federal agency liability.75 The court held that the 
“argument that the Project will inevitably result in migratory-bird 
fatalities, even if true, is unavailing because the MBTA does not 
contemplate attenuated secondary liability on agencies . . . that act in a 
purely regulatory capacity[.]”76 This implicit acceptance may be due to 
the fact that the BLM themselves have conceded that the MBTA 
encompasses incidental take resulting from wind turbine operations.77 
This concession mirrors FWS’s own view that the MBTA encompasses 
incidental take.78 
All in all, the split over the definition of MBTA take is ripe for a 
Supreme Court decision or a legislative alteration. The issue of federal 
agency liability presented by Protect Our Communities and Public 
Employees is, in a sense, merely one facet of that overarching 
argument. The questions posed by both issues are closely related, 
however. What kinds of acts or omissions can result in MBTA liability, 
and how broad is the statute’s reach? 
II.  RECENT MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY ACT LITIGATION OVER THE 
VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 
A. THE ARGUMENTS FOR APPLICATION OF THE MBTA TO AGENCY 
ACTIONS 
The goal of the plaintiffs in both Protect our Communities and 
Public Employees was, of course, to try and prevent future harm to 
protected migratory bird species. The plaintiffs tried to achieve this goal 
in part by forcing compliance with the permitting requirements of the 
MBTA and BGEPA.79 Importantly, the plaintiffs were initially not trying 
to force the lead agencies in both projects to obtain the MBTA take 
permit. Rather, the objective was to ensure that a responsible party 
obtained the permit in general. 
 
 74. Telephone Interview with Eric Glitzenstein, supra note 42. 
 75. Protect Our Cmtys. Found. v. Jewell, 825 F.3d 571, 585 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 76. Id. (emphasis added). 
 77. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 697 (1995) (noting 
that agency regulations and the Supreme Court have defined “harm” in ESA’s take provision to 
include habitat modification and other unintentional damage). 
 78. Notice of Intent, 80 Fed. Reg. 30,032 (May 26, 2015). 
 79. Forcing the developer or agency to obtain the permits would not have stopped the project 
from being built, of course, and would not have prevented the harm to protected species. The goal 
here was likely to ensure accountability, open the door to criminal liability, and possibly stall the 
development process.  
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B. PROTECT OUR COMMUNITIES FOUNDATION 
In Protect Our Communities, the plaintiffs’ argument on appeal 
was based on a straightforward syllogism: (1) the Tule Wind Project, 
like other large industrial wind projects, will inevitably and foreseeably 
kill migratory birds . . . (2) under the MBTA, the only way in which the 
killing of migratory birds may be authorized is through a permit issued 
by the FWS . . . [and] BLM’s authorization for Tule Wind to construct 
and operate a project on federal land that BLM knows will violate the 
MBTA cannot be deemed federal agency action that is “in accordance 
with law” within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act,  
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)[.]80 
Tule Wind had taken the position as an intervenor-defendant that 
it was not required to obtain a take permit at all, citing the Fifth 
Circuit’s CITGO decision where the court found that the take provision 
only extended to affirmative actions intended to harm migratory 
birds.81 Thus, it was clear that Tule did not intend to obtain a permit, 
and the plaintiffs felt that the responsibility must fall on the lead 
agency.82 The BLM, on the other hand, conceded that “MBTA liability 
plainly extends to non-hunting activities that incidentally but directly 
take migratory birds such as wind-turbine operations,” and that the 
Tule Wind Project would itself kill birds protected by the MBTA.83 The 
BLM contended that they had nonetheless not acted “contrary to law” 
within the meaning of the APA.84 The BLM relied on the fact that Tule 
had adopted a “Project-Specific Avian and Bat Protection Plan for the 
Tule Wind Project” which required “compliance with all applicable 
laws.”85 However, while the plan contained multiple references to other 
environmental protection statutes like the ESA and the Clean Water 
Act, it did not incorporate the MBTA.86 Furthermore, the BLM 
maintained that it could not be sued under the APA, arguing that the 
strictures of the MBTA did not extend to third parties who merely 
authorized the activities of an entity that may have the effect of 
resulting in the incidental take. 
Relying in large part on the D.C. Circuit case Humane Society of 
the United States v. Glickman, the plaintiffs argued that “the notion 
that the availability of an MBTA-based APA claim should turn on 
 
 80. Reply Brief of Appellant at 2, Protect Our Cmtys. Found. v. Jewell, 825 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 
2016) (No. 14-55842, 14-55666), 2015 WL 416884. 
 81. Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 80, at 2; Telephone Interview with Eric Glitzenstein, 
supra note 42. 
 82. Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 80, at 2. 
 83. Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 80, at 3 (internal quotations omitted). 
 84. Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 80, at 4–5. 
 85. Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 80, at 4–5. 
 86. Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 80, at 5. 
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whether a federal agency is undertaking an action itself or, rather, 
authorizing someone else to undertake the very same action makes no 
legal or logical sense.”87 In Glickman, plaintiffs challenged the 
Department of Agriculture’s “Integrated Goose Management Program,” 
which was an attempt to control an exploding Canada Goose population 
that was harming crop yields and contaminating water supplies.88 The 
plan called for various measures including harassment, habitat 
alteration, capture, and killing.89 The court held that federal agencies 
could be considered “persons” who may be held criminally liable for 
violating the Act or the Treaty.90 
The BLM argued that Glickman was distinguishable, as in that case 
the Department of Agriculture had been directly causing the deaths of 
protected birds, whereas the BLM was merely a third party granting a 
lease to a developer.91 The Ninth Circuit eventually agreed, finding the 
language in the right-of-way requiring compliance with all applicable 
laws and regulations was sufficient to ensure that Tule complied with 
any MBTA requirements if the need arose.92 
C. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY 
The MBTA issues and arguments presented in Public Employees 
were largely the same as those in Protect Our Communities. In Public 
Employees, the plaintiffs argued that the BOEM authorization of the 
Cape Wind project violated the MBTA.93 They likewise argued that the 
authorization was not “in accordance with law” within the meaning of 
the APA; and that Glickman applies where an agency authorizes 
another party to engage in certain conduct if that party could only 
proceed after receiving that authorization.94 The BOEM raised the same 
attenuated liability counterargument as the BLM, contending that it 
had already imposed significant measures to protect migratory birds by 
requiring adoption of the Avian and Bat Mitigation and Monitoring 
Plan as a condition of Cape Wind’s lease.95 
The major distinction between the two cases lies with the 
concessions made by Cape Wind and the BOEM. In Protect Our 
 
 87. Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 80, at 6; see also Humane Soc’y of the U.S.  
v. Glickman, 217 F.3d 882, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 88. Glickman, 217 F.3d at 884. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Protect Our Cmtys. Found., 825 F.3d at 571 (No.  
14-55666), 2016 WL 2902816. 
 92. Id. at 9–10. 
 93. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 40, Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. Hopper, 827 F.3d 
1077 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (No. 14-5303), 2015 WL 3465970. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 15. 
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Communities, the Ninth Circuit found that the language of the BLM’s 
lease meant that the BLM was not required to ensure Tule preemptively 
obtained an MBTA permit.96 In response to the pressured questioning 
of the panel at oral argument, in Public Employees the BOEM and Cape 
Wind conceded that the language of their lease required the agency to 
ensure that MBTA permits were secured prior to construction.97 
The BOEM and Cape Wind’s concessions meant that the D.C. 
Circuit could decline to directly address the issue of vicarious agency 
liability.98 Thus, the opinion of the Public Employees court did not 
explicitly contradict the Ninth Circuit’s finding in Protect Our 
Communities that MBTA liability did not extend to agencies acting in a 
licensing capacity. However, that possibility may have been the 
underlying threat that led to BOEM and Cape Wind conceding that the 
permit was required. The question remains: do the strictures of the 
MBTA extend to agencies licensing or authorizing the activities of 
entities whose activities will cause the taking of bird species protected 
by the MBTA? 
III.  FEDERAL AGENCIES CAN BE HELD VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR 
VIOLATIONS OF THE MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY ACT  
COMMITED BY DEVELOPERS THAT THEY LICENSE 
 
The text and legislative history of the MBTA provide a framework 
for a court to logically justify extending liability to third party federal 
agencies. Furthermore, comparable wildlife protection statutes are 
instructive and provide examples of when holding agencies liable in 
their permitting and licensing capacities is justified. Finally, there is a 
way to limit the applicability of the vicarious liability theory that will 
curb the risk of unlimited secondary liability. 
A. THE HISTORY, TEXT, AND INTENT OF THE MBTA 
The MBTA was largely enacted in response to the decimation of 
migratory bird populations by direct take like hunting. Rampant 
overhunting of migratory birds for their feathers (known as “millinery 
murder” because the feathers were primarily used for women’s hats) 
was the major impetus that led to Congress passing the MBTA.99 As one 
 
 96. Protect Our Cmtys. Found., 825 F.3d at 578. 
 97. Telephone Interview with Eric Glitzenstein, supra note 42; Pub. Emps. for Envtl. 
Responsibility, 827 F.3d at 1088 n.11.  
 98. Telephone Interview with Eric Glitzenstein, supra note 42. 
 99. Kristina Rozan, Detailed Discussion of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, ANIMAL LEGAL & 
HISTORICAL CTR. (2014) (noting that the MBTA was preceded by the nation’s first wildlife 
conservation law, the Weeks-McLean Act, which was passed in response to the same issues that the 
MBTA addressed. The Weeks-McLean act was quickly challenged on the basis of the historical right 
of the states to regulate wildlife and was declared unconstitutional). 
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senator stated, the MBTA was intended to “keep pothunters from killing 
game out of season, ruining the eggs of nesting birds, and ruining the 
country by it.”100 These direct take origins, and the common law roots of 
the term “take” itself, form the basis of the CITGO decision declining to 
extend the MBTA to instances of incidental take.101 This logic can be 
extended from the incidental take issue to the vicarious liability issue 
presented in Protect Our Communities. If the statute only contemplated 
hunting at the time of enactment, what basis is there for extending its 
restrictions to a federal agency granting a lease to a third party? While 
the history and text of the statute do not provide an overt basis for 
extending liability to an overseeing agency, they do seem to indicate 
that the statute can and should encompass incidental take scenarios. It 
follows that the statute’s restrictions could logically be extended to an 
agency if that agency’s action is both a proximate and but-for cause of 
harm. 
B. MOTIVATIONS BEYOND HUNTING 
The MBTA came about in reaction to overhunting, but the benefits 
offered by migratory bird species were also used as a justification for 
acting to protect them. The primary justification cited was the fact that 
they provided a reliable means of protecting crops by consuming 
damaging insects.102 Congress took notice of the annual food losses 
sustained by insects and used the numbers as a basis for the passing the 
MBTA.103 In the first major Supreme Court challenge to the 
constitutionality of the statute, the Court held that it saw “nothing in 
the Constitution that compels the Government to sit by while a food 
supply is cut off and the protectors of our forests and our crops are 
destroyed.”104 Congress also recognized the inherent aesthetic value of 
migratory birds.105 The MBTA guaranteed that migratory birds would 
continue to be part of America’s aesthetic recreation by “[providing a] 
place where [migratory birds] can come and remain safely and be a 
pleasure and companions.”106 Furthermore, the list of protected species 
included “a number of songbirds and other birds not commonly 
 
 100. Hye-Jong Linda Lee, Note, The Pragmatic Migratory Bird Treaty Act: Protecting 
“Property,” 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 649, 652 (2004) (internal quotations omitted). 
 101. U.S. v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477, 490–91 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 102. Lee, supra note 100, at 662. 
 103. Lee, supra note 100, at 653. 
 104. Mo v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434–35 (1920). 
 105. 56 CONG. REC. 7458 (1918). 
 106. Id. 
I – CROTON_11 (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/10/2018  10:16 AM 
February 2018]                   IT’S ALWAYS WINDY IN MCCAIN VALLEY 663 
hunted.”107 Congress imposed criminal penalties on those who killed 
these birds as well as on persons who hunted game birds.108 
There were thus numerous motivations behind enacting the statute 
besides combatting overhunting. This implies that the purpose of the 
statute was not strictly to keep hunters and trappers from 
indiscriminately killing birds, but rather to protect the bird populations 
from harm regardless of how that harm occurred. 
If one of the goals of the statute is to ensure that migratory bird 
species continue to feed on crop-damaging insect species, then it should 
make no difference whether those birds are purposefully harmed by 
hunters or incidentally by wind turbines. By that same token, if the 
statute is intended to prevent harm to endangered birds, it should not 
matter whether the entity being held liable is an individual or an 
agency. This was the foundation of the Glickman decision, which held 
that for the purposes of the MBTA, there is no material difference 
between requiring the same level of compliance from a federal agency 
as is required from individual hunters.109 It follows that if a developer is 
unable to undertake the action that will foreseeably harm protected 
birds without the approval of a federal agency, then the agency is a 
proximate cause of the harm and should be held equally liable. 
C. LATER TREATIES REACHED WITH OTHER COUNTRIES 
The MBTA came about as a result of the United States entering a 
treaty with Great Britain: the “Convention with Great Britain [on behalf 
of Canada] for the Protection of Migratory Birds.”110 As described above, 
the United States went on to enter into similar agreements with several 
other countries.111 These treaties were then incorporated into the 
provisions of the MBTA, although each treaty differed in its scope and 
goals.112 
As described previously, the Canadian Convention cited the 
importance of migratory birds as a food source and predators of crop 
damaging insects as the main reasons for entering into the treaty.113 The 
Mexican Convention, however, focused more broadly on preserving 
migratory birds “for purposes of sport, food, commerce, and 
industry.”114 The Japanese and Russian conventions went even further, 
 
 107. U.S. v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510, 532 (E.D. Cal. 1978), aff’d, 578 F.2d 259 (9th 
Cir. 1978). 
 108. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. at 532. 
 109. Humane Soc’y of the U.S. v. Glickman, 217 F.3d 882, 883 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 110. Convention Between United States and Great Britain (on behalf of Canada) for the 
Protection of Migratory Birds, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Aug. 16, 1916, 39 Stat. 1702. 
 111. Lee, supra note 100, at 665. 
 112. Lee, supra note 100, at 665. 
 113. Lee, supra note 100, at 665. 
 114. Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Game Mammals, U.S.-Mex., Feb.  
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announcing the general goal of enhancing the environment of migratory 
birds, finding them a natural resource of great recreational, aesthetic, 
scientific, cultural, ecological, and economic value.115 
Each successive treaty also broadened the scope of the species of 
protected birds. The Canadian Convention defined protected birds as 
migratory game birds, migratory insectivorous birds, and migratory 
non-game birds.116 By contrast, the Mexican Convention listed 
protected families of migratory birds without specifying the species 
included in such families.117 The Japanese Convention broadened the 
list of protected birds to non-migratory birds common to both Japan 
and the United States.118 The Russian Convention included species and 
subspecies that migrated between the two countries and those with 
separate populations sharing common breeding, wintering, feeding, or 
molting areas.119 
These international attempts to protect migratory birds, each 
increasing in scope and drawing from a broadening array of 
motivations, provide an indication of the extent to which the United 
States government has historically been concerned with protecting 
migratory bird species. If a sovereign nation enters into a treaty with 
another in order to achieve a certain purpose, the administrative 
agencies of that country should be held to the same standard of care and 
responsibility as the country itself. On this basis, it is reasonable to 
require that government agencies ensure that private parties acting 
under their supervision comply with applicable statutes like the MBTA 
or face the same liability for noncompliance as the private party. 
D. TEXTUAL ANALYSIS 
The broad, comprehensive prohibitory language of section 703 also 
provides a foundation for an argument for imposing liability on 
agencies acting in a regulatory or permitting capacity. The long list of 
forbidden actions, some of them vague, is an indication that the act was 
intended to guard against a wide range of possibilities and provide 
protection in general rather than counter specific intentional 
activities.120 “While hunting and poaching were made illegal by the 
 
7, 1936, 50 Stat. 1311, 1312. 
 115. Convention for Protection of Migratory Birds and Birds in Danger of Extinction in their 
Environment, U.S.-Japan, Mar. 4, 1972, 979 U.N.T.S. 149; Convention Concerning the Conservation 
of Migratory Birds and Their Environment, U.S.-U.S.S.R., Nov. 19, 1976, 29 U.S.T. 4647, 4649. 
 116. Convention Between United States and Great Britain, supra note 110, at 1702. 
 117. Lee, supra note 100, at 654. 
 118. Lee, supra note 100, at 654. 
 119. Lee, supra note 100, at 654. 
 120. Rozan, supra note 99, at 2. 
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MBTA, so were accidentally steering a wagon over a bird’s nest or 
picking up an egg shell.”121 
No definitions or descriptions are offered for the activities 
forbidden by the statute.122 The act forbids not only pursuing, hunting 
and taking protected species, but also causing them to be bought, sold, 
or transported.123 The same protections apply to parts of birds and their 
eggs or nests.124 The MBTA gives the Secretary of the Interior the 
authority to 
carry out the purposes of the conventions . . . having due regard to the 
zones of temperature and to the distribution, abundance, economic 
value, breeding habits, and times and lines of migratory flight of such 
birds, to determine when, to what extent, if at all, and by what means, 
it is compatible with the terms of the conventions to allow hunting, 
taking, capture, killing, possession, sale, purchase, shipment, 
transportation, carriage, or export of any such bird, or any part, nest, 
or egg thereof . . . .125 
The misdemeanor charge of the MBTA amounts to a strict liability 
crime, as did the felony provision prior to amendments made in 1986.126 
By the plain terms of the statute, it is possible for an entity to be found 
guilty of violating the MBTA without having intended to commit the 
prohibited act.127 The strict liability nature of the MBTA’s misdemeanor 
penalty provisions formed the basis of the United States v. FMC Corp. 
and United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., decisions.128 One of the goals 
of the statute was to provide a strong incentive against causing harm to 
migratory bird species generally, as it required no element of intent or 
knowledge. At least one court has held that the MBTA applied to taking 
and killing “by any means or in any manner.”129 That court found that 
the Act did not “suggest in any way that only direct applications of force 
constitute ‘killing’ or ‘taking,’” and that the plain language of the Act 
made it clear that intent was “irrelevant.”130 
On its face, the statute does not contemplate who causes the harm 
or how. It simply seeks to prevent harm to the listed species in general, 
and punish those responsible for causing that harm. “As legislation 
goes, [section] 703 contains broad and unqualified language‘at any 
 
 121. Rozan, supra note 99, at 2. 
 122. Rozan, supra note 99, at Section I. 
 123. Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2012). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at § 704(a). 
 126. Id. at § 707(a); Rozan, supra note 99, at Section III.E. 
 127. Rozan, supra note 99, at Section III.E. 
 128. U.S. v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 908 (2d Cir. 1978); U.S. v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 
679, 684 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 129. U.S. v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1075 (D. Colo. 1999) (quoting  
16 U.S.C § 703(a)). 
 130. Id. at 1078. 
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time,’ ‘by any means,’ ‘in any manner,’ ‘any migratory bird.’”131 Broad, 
vague language and penalty provisions are an indication of legislation 
that can justifiably be construed broadly, which would explain the wide 
variation in interpretations that courts have applied.132 The statute bars 
a wide range of activities that can potentially harm migratory birds and 
their nests, and grants the Secretary of the Interior purview to enforce 
both the provisions of the statute and the treaties.133 It follows that the 
statute protects migratory bird species generally, rather than 
prohibiting harmful activities specifically. Moreover, under the 
Glickman court’s logic, there is no reason the statute should not also 
apply to federal agencies.134 So if harm to protected bird species is 
completely foreseeable, and will not occur but for an action taken by an 
agency, the statute’s terms do not prevent MBTA liability from being 
extended to an agency acting in a third-party regulatory capacity. 
E. THE ESA AND VICARIOUS LIABILITY 
The general concept of holding agencies vicariously liable for 
actions that harm protected wildlife is not a new one. In fact, 
attempting to hold agencies vicariously liable under the ESA has been a 
popular strategy in recent years.135 As one commentator put it, “the 
leverage vicarious liability gives to environmental preservation 
advocates is simply irresistible.”136 That said, academia has not 
embraced the theory, and its success in the courts has fluctuated.137 
Critics justifiably warn that “almost no private action takes place in the 
complete absence of some connection to government regulation,” and 
that a well-developed vicarious liability doctrine for “permitting and 
licensing liability” could lead to near limitless application of liability to 
agencies and governmental bodies.138 Nonetheless, the ESA cases lay a 
strong foundation by analogy for applying the theory in MBTA 
permitting situations. 
F. NOTABLE CASES 
“In Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, [] the Eighth Circuit held that 
EPA’s ‘decision to register pesticides’ made the agency liable for illegal 
 
 131. Humane Soc’y of the U.S. v. Glickman, 217 F.3d 882, 885 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 132. Rozan, supra note 99, at Section I. 
 133. Rozan, supra note 99, at Section I. 
 134. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 14, Protect Our Cmtys. Found. v. Jewell, 825 F.3d 571 (9th 
Cir. 2016) (No. 14-55842), 2015 WL 416884. 
 135. J.B. Ruhl, State and Local Government Vicarious Liability Under the ESA, NAT. RESOURCES 
& ENV’T 70, 70 (2001). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 71. 
 138. Id. at 70, 75. 
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taking of protected species resulting from use of the pesticides.”139 
Farmers and ranchers had been using bait laced with strychnine to 
eradicate pesky rodents, but the black-footed ferreta protected 
specieswas also consuming the bait.140 “[T]he court found [the] EPA 
liable because the strychnine could only have been distributed with 
[the] EPA’s registration approval.”141 The court stated that “strychnine 
can be distributed only if it is registered” and that “the EPA’s decision to 
register pesticides containing strychnine or to continue these 
registrations was critical to the resulting poisonings of endangered 
species.”142 The court found that “the relationship between the 
registration decision and the deaths of endangered species [was] 
clear.”143 The court based its theory of vicarious liability on National 
Wildlife Federation v. Hodel, in which “[t]he FWS had authorized the 
use of lead shot, ammunition which resulted in secondary poisoning of 
bald eagles.”144 The Hodel court also “held the FWS’s authorization 
constituted a taking under the ESA.”145 
“Similarly, in Sierra Club v. Yeutter, [] the Fifth Circuit ruled that 
the Forest Service’s approval of a timber management plan for a 
national forest made the agency liable when the private timber 
harvesting” damaged a crucial habitat of the protected red cockaded 
woodpecker.146 The court found that the Forest Service did not 
“completely implement the provisions” of its wildlife management 
handbook when it had permitted clearcutting within two hundred feet 
of the woodpecker’s preferred trees.147 The court found that this course 
of conduct impaired the woodpecker’s “essential behavioral 
patterns.”148 The court held that this failure to adequately implement 
the requirements of the handbook constituted a taking under the 
ESA.149 
The ESA vicarious liability argument has been applied to state and 
local governments as well as federal agencies.150 In Strahan v. Coxe, the 
leading vicarious liability wildlife case, the First Circuit found the state 
of Massachusetts liable for harm to whales caused by commercial 
 
 139. Id. at 71 (quoting Defs. of Wildlife v. Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency, 882 F.2d 1294, 1301 (8th 
Cir. 1989)). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Defs of Wildlife, 882 F.2d at 1301. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. (citing Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Hodel, 23 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1089, 1092–93 (E.D. Cal. 1985). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Ruhl, supra note 135, at 71 (citing Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429, 438-39 (5th Cir. 1991)). 
 147. Yeutter, 926 F.2d at 438. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 439. 
 150. See Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1997). 
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fishing operations.151 The court held that “it is not possible for a licensed 
commercial fishing operation to use its gillnets or lobster pots in the 
manner permitted by the Commonwealth without risk of violating the 
ESA by exacting a taking.”152 The defendants argued that the statute was 
not intended to prohibit state licensure activity because such activity 
could always be found to be a “proximate cause” of the taking.153 The 
defendants pointed to common law tort principles and argued that “the 
district court improperly found that its regulatory scheme ‘indirectly 
causes’ these takings.”154 The First Circuit disagreed, finding that “[t]he 
causation here, while indirect, is not so removed that it extends outside 
the realm of causation as it is understood in the common law.”155 
The Eleventh Circuit has seen the argument extended to its utmost. 
In Loggerhead Turtle v. Volusia County, female loggerhead turtles 
approaching a beach to nest were turned away by bright lights, and 
hatchlings turned away from the water confusing the bright lights for a 
full moon.156 “[T]he Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiff turtles had 
standing to sue the county to allege ‘harmfully inadequate regulation’ of 
lighting in violation of the ESA” “because the county had the authority 
to regulate municipal and private beach lighting.”157 The countywhich 
had been granted an incidental take permitargued that the FWS had 
impliedly contemplated that the county be excepted from liability for 
any incidental take that artificial beachfront lighting caused.158 The 
county based its argument on the fact that FWS had required it to 
survey every light source, study their impacts and implement methods 
to correct light sources that disorient sea turtles.159 The court disagreed, 
finding that the incidental take permit exception to the take prohibition 
did not apply to activity performed as a purely mitigating measure upon 
which a permit is conditioned.160 
Just as the use of strychnine bait by farmers in Defenders of 
Wildlife required the permission of the EPA, and just as the fishing 
operations in Strahan required permits granted by the state of 
Massachusetts, the Tule Wind Project could not have been built without 
the BLM’s approval.161 The causal chain is not so fine as to be 
impermissibly attenuated; it is in fact rather short and stout. There 
 
 151. Id. at 164. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 163. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 164. 
 156. Loggerhead Turtle v. Volusia Cty., Fla., 148 F.3d 1231, 1235 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 157. Ruhl, supra note 135, at 72 (quoting Loggerhead Turtle, 148 F.3d at 1250). 
 158. Loggerhead Turtle 148 F.3d at 1236–37. 
 159. Id. at 1236. 
 160. Id. at 1242. 
 161. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 134, at 1. 
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must be limits, however, lest an endlessly spiraling and completely 
unworkable theory of liability ensues. Those limits were what concerned 
the court in Protect our Communities, and are addressed below.162 
Furthermore, the MBTA is not the ESA. While ESA “take” cases provide 
analogous guidance, the statutes differ in several ways. 
G. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE ESA AND MBTA, CITIZEN SUIT 
PROVISIONS, AND THE ROLE OF THE APA 
The MBTA and the ESA are fundamentally different statutes. Some 
commentators have opined that the “cause to be” language in the MBTA 
“refers not to those enabling the act of shipping or carrying, but seems 
to refer instead to those coordinating that act.”163 This contrasts with 
the language of the ESA, which explicitly includes government entities 
responsible for providing permits, even though those entities are not 
coordinating the permitted activity.164 However, as discussed above, an 
agency acting in a permitting or leasing capacity in a situation like the 
development of the Tule Wind Project is still both a but-for and 
proximate cause of impermissible take, and would thus arguably fall 
within the “cause to be” language. 
Furthermore, the MBTAunlike the ESAdoes not contain a 
citizen suit provision.165 Only Department of the Interior officials are 
empowered to enforce the MBTA.166 At least in the context of ensuring 
that take permitting requirements are met, the APA potentially solves 
this problem. The D.C. Circuit has explicitly held that an individual 
citizen or citizens’ group can enforce limitations against federal 
agencies using civil injunctions brought under the APA, and the Ninth 
Circuit seems to have accepted this basic premise in Protect Our 
Communities.167As was the situation in Protect Our Communities and 
Public Employees, the combination of the APA and the MBTA results in 
a form of makeshift citizen suit provision. While not capable of 
implicating federal agencies in actual regulatory violations, the APA at 
least provides a method by which an interested non-governmental party 
can attempt to ensure that requisite permits are obtained. 
 
 162. See infra Part III.I. 
 163. William M. McLaren, Comment, An Endangered Theory: Vicarious Liability Under the 
Endangered Species Act, 44 ENVTL. L. 1203, 1216 (2014). 
 164. Id. Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA requires federal agencies to consult with FWS or NMFS to 
ensure protected species will not be jeopardized as a result of “any action authorized, funded, or 
carried out by such agency.” Endangered Species Act § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012). 
 165. Martin, supra note 53, at 1. 
 166. Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 707(a) (2012). 
 167. Humane Soc’y of the U.S. v. Glickman, 217 F.3d 882, 886 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Protect Our 
Cmtys. Found. v. Jewell, 825 F.3d 571, 585 (9th Cir. 2016). 
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H. THE MIDDLE GROUNDFORESEEABILITY AND INEVITABILITY 
In Protect Our Communities, the Ninth Circuit found that 
stretching the MBTA and APA to encompass administrative agency 
permitting actions would be a step too far.168 The court found that the 
BLM “only authorized Tule to construct and operate a wind energy 
facility on public lands, and therefore did not act to ‘take’ migratory 
birds without a permit within the meaning of the MBTA.”169 As to the 
question of whether the agency’s actions were in accordance with the 
requirements of the APA, the court found that “the APA does not target 
regulatory action by the BLM that permits a third party grantee like 
Tule to engage in otherwise lawful behavior, and only incidentally leads 
to subsequent unlawful action by that third party.”170 The court stated 
that “[t]he causal mechanism in question is too speculative and indirect 
to impose liability on the BLM for engaging in routine regulatory 
action.”171 The court further found that the plaintiff’s claim “verge[d] on 
argument for unbounded agency vicarious liability” and that BLM’s 
right-of-way “did not sanction or authorize the taking of migratory birds 
without a permit; it authorized the development of a wind-energy 
facility.”172 
These concerns reflect the criticisms of the vicarious liability theory 
as applied to the ESA, as well as the concerns raised by opponents of the 
incidental take theory. Where should liability end? Critics of the 
incidental take theory are fond of raising the slippery slope argument, 
and justifiably so.173 Unfortunately, lots of things kill migratory birds. 
Domestic cats kill approximately 2.4 billion birds each year, far more 
than wind turbines (although one may assume that they do not often 
attack bald eagles).174 Could the owner of a cat be liable under the 
MBTA? Birds also frequently die from flying into glass windows. Could 
a homeowner be liable for MBTA take? 
The concerns over the limits of the application of the MBTA to 
incidental take situations are substantially the same as those for the 
vicarious agency liability argument. Commentators have noted that 
“[a]ny major land development or resource extraction project these 
days requires a multitude of permits, often from federal, state, and local 
governments.”175 There is always a risk that a major development action 
 
 168. Protect Our Cmtys. Found., 825 F.3d at 586–87. 
 169. Id. at 585. 
 170. Id. at 586. 
 171. Id. at 586–87. 
 172. Id. 
 173. U.S. v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 447, 494 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 174. Cats and Birds: A Bad Combination, AM. BIRD CONSERVANCY, https://abcbirds.org/ 
program/cats-indoors/cats-and-birds (last visited Jan. 20, 2018). 
 175. Ruhl, supra note 135, at 74. 
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or activity requiring some form of federal agency approval can result in 
the taking of a listed bird. The defense in Strahan argued that: 
the Commonwealth’s licensure of a generally permitted activity does 
not cause the taking any more than its licensure of automobiles and 
drivers solicits or causes federal crimes, even though automobiles it 
licenses are surely used to violate federal drug laws, rob federally 
insured banks, or cross state lines for the purpose of violating state 
and federal laws.176 
The vicarious liability argument is volatile, and if given free rein 
can indeed result in the “unbounded agency vicarious liability” the 
Ninth Circuit was so afraid of. 
There is a middle road, however, which can tether the theory and 
make it more viable. It lies with the foreseeability and inevitability of 
the take, and whether the take could not occur but for the agency 
granting the permit or license. This essentially formed the basis of the 
court’s holding in Strahan: 
[W]hereas it is possible for a person licensed by Massachusetts to use 
a car in a manner that does not risk the violations of federal law 
suggested by the defendants, it is not possible for a licensed 
commercial fishing operation to use its gillnets or lobster pots in the 
manner permitted by the Commonwealth without risk of violating 
the ESA by exacting a taking. Thus, the state’s licensure of gillnet and 
lobster pot fishing does not involve the intervening independent actor 
that is a necessary component of the other licensure schemes which it 
argues are comparable.177 
In Protect Our Communities, the Tule Wind Project was being 
built on BLM lands, and could thus only have been built if the BLM 
granted Tule a lease.178 The plaintiffs argued that the environmental 
impact statement incontrovertibly showed that the Tule Wind Project 
would have “‘unavoidable adverse impacts’ to migratory birds,” in that a 
number of bird species in the area “regularly fly at heights that will 
place them directly in the turbines’ vast ‘rotor swept area.’”179 There was 
no question as to whether the turbines would cause the deaths of birds 
listed under the MBTA.180 Similarly, in Public Employees, the plaintiffs 
pointed out that “FWS prepared a draft biological opinion that found 
that the turbines would directly kill at least 80 to 100 roseate terns and 
ten piping plovers over the minimum twenty year life of the project.”181 
If the projects were to go ahead, the deaths were inevitable, and 
completely foreseeable. The defendants in Public Employees conceded 
 
 176. Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 163–64 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 177. Id. at 164 (emphasis added). 
 178. Protect Our Cmtys. Found. v. Jewell, 825 F.3d 571, 577 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 179. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 134, at 6–7. 
 180. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 134, at 7. 
 181. Brief for Appellant, supra note 38, at 10. 
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that this was reason enough to secure the take permit prior to 
construction, as they were guaranteed to violate the MBTA otherwise.182 
This is a very different situation from granting a driver’s license 
without knowing whether the grantee will then use that license to drive 
a car to commit a crime. It is also different from installing a window or 
adopting a cat without being certain that it will not kill an endangered 
bird. Even operating an oil processing facility that birds may or may not 
fly into is dissimilar. In this situation, a federal agency grants a lease to 
enable the building of a project while fully aware that the project is 
guaranteed to kill protected birds. In the language of tort law, this 
amounts to proximate cause. The harm is not only entirely foreseeable, 
but can be traced directly back to the granting of the lease. 
That reasoning leads to my proposed solution to the dilemma of 
federal agency obligations under the MBTA, and the circuit split. 
Specifically, in the limited situation where an action requiring a federal 
agency’s permit or license will inevitably cause a take, an agency must 
require MBTA permitting as a condition of issuing an authorization. If it 
fails to do so, its authorization may be set aside as arbitrary and 
capricious. 
The danger of unlimited liability lies with extending vicarious 
liability into situations where the harm is not foreseeable or inevitable 
and cannot be directly traced to the federal agency’s action. A federal 
agency is tasked, sometimes specifically and sometimes broadly, with 
easing and ensuring the administration of federal law. As such, it is not 
absurd to ask that a federal agency ensure that third-party developers 
comply with federal law. The BLM could have stipulated that Tule 
obtain an MBTA permit prior to construction, as it did with provisions 
of other comparable environmental statutes, but it did not.183 This 
would not have changed the fact that the third-party developer was still 
held ultimately responsible. The potential for holding an agency liable 
in this context simply provides a strong incentive for ensuring that 
agencies granting leases or permits comply with the letter of the law 
themselves. 
CONCLUSION 
Renewable energy might be the way of the future, but transitioning 
to an energy infrastructure rooted in wind and solar will not come 
without costs. Wind turbines kill eagles, and the legislature and society 
in general have deemed these avian creatures and other migratory birds 
worth protecting. In order to incentivize achieving this goal, federal 
 
 182. Brief for Appellant, supra note 38, at 23; Telephone Interview with Eric Glitzenstein, supra 
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agencies can and should be held to the same standards of care and 
liability as private entities, as the D.C. Circuit held in Glickman. 
Holding an agency like the BLM vicariously liable for its licensing and 
permitting activities to ensure that they mandate grantee and  
lease-holder compliance with MBTA take permitting requirements 
furthers this goal. Limiting its applicability to situations like that of 
Protect Our Communities and Public Employees, where the take is 
certain to occur, keeps the liability theory from spinning out of control. 
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